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It has never been a secret that information 
superiority is the key to military victory.  Military 
leaders have realized this for centuries.  There is no 
substitute for knowledge of the battlespace.  Yet, NCW, 
which utilizes information superiority as its key element, 
is a relatively new idea. 
The reason that NCW has only recently been conceived 
is simply technology.  Recently, technology has evolved at 
an unprecedented rate, giving birth to new platforms, new 
capabilities, and new threat scenarios.  All this has 
transformed modern ‘battle’ into something new and 
previously unseen.  These advances have brought about a 
situation where time and distance are, for all practical 
purposes, insignificant.  Forces that are not in the same 
geographical location can still assist one another, and 
worldwide communications are virtually instantaneous.   
However, with this increasingly powerful military 
technology comes increasingly powerful civilian technology 
as well.  Television brings war to every living room.  This 
intense public examination can cause events to be magnified 
out of proportion, either in a good direction or a bad 
direction.  Therefore, military commanders have to pay 
extra attention to their target selections.  Collateral 
damage is almost always unacceptable to the American 
public.  This brings about a new judging point for the 
military.  They are no longer critiqued for mission 
accomplishment, but now for mission accomplishment with 
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minimum force and losses.  The military must learn to use 
its NCW assets to achieve more stealthy maneuvers, while at 
the same time keeping public expectations realistic. 
In summary, the considerable recent changes in 
technology have produced this new concept, NCW.  These 
changes have drastically impacted the military’s manner 
towards information operations, acceptable information 
losses, and the detail of a given Common Operating Picture 
(COP).  These have enormous implications on the very basics 
of warfare, and have caused this new outlook and stance.   
 
B. PURPOSE 
This thesis introduces the concept of Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW) to the reader and devotes a chapter to its 
explanation.  It is rather crucial for the reader to 
realize that NCW is sufficiently vague and still ‘in-
progress’, and this chapter-length explanation of NCW is 
not intended to be a complete defining work.  Rather, it is 
intended to acquaint the reader with the purpose and 
reasoning behind NCW. 
This study also introduces another new concept to the 
reader: 802.20 wireless networking.  As this technology is 
also rather new, this thesis presents 802.20 in broad 
terms, rather than getting down into the minute detail.  
That is to say, this is a 10,000-foot view of 802.20, vice 
a more technical manual. 
Once these two concepts have been introduced and 
explained, this thesis will address the benefits to the 
military of involving 802.20 in NCW.  It will point out how 
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this new technology will benefit the military decision 
makers vastly more than the current technology (802.11).   
 
C. SCOPE 
This thesis seeks to answer a series of questions 
involving both NCW and 802.20:  
 What makes 802.20 different from 802.11? 
What are the affected areas of NCW that this 
technology would benefit? 
Is 802.20 capable of performing in military 
environments? 
Can 802.20 offer more to the military than 802.11? 
 
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1. Analysis of the current 802.20 protocol 
2. Introduction to Network Centric Warfare 
3. Comparison between 802.11 and 802.20 
4. Proposal of expected benefits to NCW using 802.20  
  
E. CHAPTERS OVERVIEW 
Chapter  I.   –  Introduction 
Chapter  II.  –  Definition and Explanation of NCW 
Chapter  III. –  Explanation of 802.20 
Chapter  IV.  -  Vulnerabilities of 802.11 
Chapter  V.   -  802.20 and the TNT Experiments 
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II.  NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE (NCW) 
A. DEFINITION   
 Network Centric Warfare is one of those conceptually 
driven ideas that is not exactly concrete in its 
definition.  However, there are some ideas and thoughts 
that repeatedly come up when discussing NCW.  These ideas 
are listed below: 
1. “Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is an information 
superiority enabled concept of operations that 
generates increased combat power by networking 
sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve 
shared awareness, increased speed of command, 
higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, 
increased survivability, and a degree of self-
synchronization.  In essence, NCW translates 
information superiority into combat power by 
effectively linking knowledge entities in the 
battlespace.” (Logan 2003). 
2. “Network-Centric Warfare derives its power from 
the strong networking of a well-informed but 
geographically dispersed force.  The enabling 
elements are a high-performance information grid, 
access to all appropriate information sources, 
weapons reach and maneuver with precision and 
speed of response, value-adding command and 
control (C2) processes—to include high-speed 
automates assignment of resources to need—and 
integrated sensor grids closely coupled in time 
to shooters and C2 processes.  Network-Centric 
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Warfare is applicable to all levels of warfare 
and contributes to the coalescence of strategy, 
operations, and tactics.  It is transparent to 
mission, force size and composition, and 
geography.” (Cebrowski, 1998). 
3. “A Warfighting Concept that enables a Network 
Centric Force to significantly increase combat 
power by achieving increased awareness, shared 
awareness, degree of interoperability, 
survivability, lethality, responsiveness, 
operational tempo, and ability to self-
synchronize.” (Alberts & Garcia, Dec 1999). 
From the above definitions, it is plain that they share 
three common elements of NCW that should be focused upon.  
These are the reasoning behind NCW, the means of 
establishing it, and the desired outcome. 
 
B. STRUCTURE 
1. Underlying Reasoning 
Network Centric Warfare relies heavily on having 
Information Superiority of the Battlefield.  Information 
Superiority is attained when the information gathered by 
friendly forces gives them a clear and dominant advantage 
over all their adversaries.  This Information Superiority 
can then be exploited to give friendly forces a decisive 
competitive advantage.  This principle is the reasoning 





The question now becomes what is the way of reaching 
this advantageous position?  What steps must be followed to 
ensure Information Superiority?  In broad terms, access to 
all needed information sources must be granted and shared 
among all involved forces.  In particular, sensors, 
shooters, and decision makers need to be linked to this 
information-sharing network.  This infrastructure is 
complicated and deserves much more explanation, but for 
now, suffice it to say that these networks support the 
compilation and dissemination of common awareness. 
3. Desired Outcome (Lim, 2004) 
It is crucial to keep in mind that for a successful 
conversion from a platform-centric force, a different way 
of thinking must also occur with the changes in technology 
and networking.  With the successful implementation of 
Network Centric Warfare, the information networking that 
can be achieved by the friendly forces will ultimately lead 
to an enhanced combat power.  In particular, this enhanced 
combat power would be most visible in the following areas:  
a. Decision Superiority 
b. Dominant Maneuver 
c. Precision Engagement 
d. Focused Logistics 
e. Full Dimensional Protection 
 
C. ENHANCED COMBAT POWER 
NCW is advertised as bringing with it an intense 
enhancement of the current combat power of any given 
platform-centric force.  The following paragraphs break 
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this down into the five previously mentioned categories and 
provide documented evidence of this enhancement. 
1. Decision Superiority 
Decision superiority is an immediate result of having 
information superiority.  When military forces have much 
more information at their disposal, much less guesswork is 
required to make the correct decision.  However, having 
information superiority does not necessarily imply that one 
also has decision superiority.  Rather, taking the given 
information and applying experience, training, and judgment 
leads to decision superiority.  Also, it is not a 
capability of the individual in charge.  It refers to the 
war fighting force as a whole, including the actual 
combatants, supporting staffs, and the efficiency of the 
communication back and forth between all involved. 
2. Dominant Maneuver 
Dominant maneuver is the ability of Joint forces to 
gain a positional advantage over the adversary with 
decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the 
achievement of assigned military tasks (US JCS, 2000).  NCW 
enables this dominant maneuver through timed coordination 
of units, gathering of intelligence and feedback, and the 
anticipation of events leading to mission success.  These 
allow for the concurrent movement and massing of forces 
that are widely dispersed, as well as the coordination of 
their fire, thereby achieving the objective of dominant 
maneuver.  
3. Precision Engagement 
Precision Engagement is the ability of Joint Forces to 
locate, survey, discern, an track objectives or targets; 
select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate 
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desired effects; assess results; and reengage with decisive 
speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required 
throughout the full range of military operations (US JCS, 
2000) 
NCW greatly enhances a force’s ability to acquire and 
engage targets with both greater precision and at a reduced 
risk to one’s own assets.  This is achieved through 
improved situational awareness and cooperative sensing.  
NCW enables firepower to be much better coordinated by 
using a high performance cooperative network of sensors.  
No longer do combat aircraft have to depend solely upon 
their organic sensors for weapons delivery.  In NCW, the 
aircraft can make use of other sensors, thus staying 
stealthy for a longer period of time, therefore increasing 
the element of surprise, mission effectiveness, and 
certainly its own chance of survival.  Now each platform 
can make use of information that far exceeds its own 
respective organic assets.   
4. Focused Logistics 
Focused Logistics is the ability to provide the Joint 
force the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the 
right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity 
across the full range of military operations (US JCS, 
2000).  A real-time, Internet based information system is 
used by NCW to boost this capability.  It provides total 
asset visibility as part of a common operating picture that 
is viewed by all other participants in the battle space.  
This has the effect of linking the operators with the 
logistics and support units, thus intensifying the 
efficiency of the fighting force as a whole. 
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5. Full Dimensional Protection 
Full Dimensional Protection is the ability of the 
Joint force to protect its personnel and other assets 
required to decisively execute assigned tasks (US JCS, 
2000).  This is achieved through applying a multilayered 
defense mechanism in both the active and passive domains.  
Since the capabilities of sensors and weapons are rapidly 
increasing with time, geographical location of forces tends 
to lose importance, as forces no longer have to be in the 
same area to assist each other with the mission.  NCW uses 
this to both augment sensor power as well as to minimize 
risk, since assets do not have to be geographically located 
close to each other.   
 
D. MEASURES OF SUCCESS 
To make NCW a viable decision, a number of key 
features must be present.  These are having the 
organization focused on the same goal, establishing a 
modern and freethinking environment, and establishing 
viable measurements of effectiveness (MOE) for NCW. 
1. Focused Goals 
As is the case in any major organization planning to 
make a drastic shift in policy, having everyone prepared 
and focused along the desired goal is crucial.  The 
commitment of not only the decision makers, but also 
everyone, down to the shooters and support staff, must be 
firm and resolute.  This is because the effort required to 
shift a doctrine from a platform-centric institution to a 
network-centric one is one that will take quite some time.  
For that reason, there must be an alignment of attitudes 
throughout the military.   
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2. Promoting a Successful Environment 
With all the technological advances that have been 
discussed, it is important to notice that in order to 
employ these technologies to their maximum ability, there 
must exist a climate accommodating to this technology.  
That is, if a climate of innovation and progressive 
thinking is present, it will result in creative new and 
better ways of accomplishing missions and mission 
objectives.  Although it is much easier said than done, the 
military must learn to discard its old planning methods and 
strategies, and apply new, more modern plans that 
incorporate all the aspects of NCW.  Success in 
implementing NCW not only depends upon the proper 
technology advances, but also the proper methods of 
applying these changes.  The military must implement new 
network-centric ways of operating that use the full 
spectrum of the technologies involved. 
3. Infrastructure 
To be a success, NCW must have a secure and coherently 
networked infrastructure.  Without this seamless and robust 
infrastructure, network-centric operations simply cannot be 
performed.  Realistically, performing network-centric 
operations without the proper infrastructure in place will 
probably compromise the mission much more than it would 
assist it.  Therefore, it is obvious that before its 
implementation, there must be an effort to develop and 
establish the proper infrastructure.  While involved in 
this process, there must be serious consideration given to 
the cost-effectiveness of proposed solutions.  While 
financial prudence is a good trend to follow, system 
requirements must not be compromised simply to meet expense 
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goals.  Especially in NCW, where technology is a keystone, 
systems level requirements must be planned and achieved.  
Of course, that’s not to say that open source and off-the-
shelf technology should not be used at all, just not when 
the performance of the system is at stake.    
4. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) 
As with any new system, it is vital that goals be 
realized before the actual implementation of the project.  
The value of various investments toward NCW must be 
established, and there must be a method of establishing 
progress using both explicit and indefinite measures. In 
measuring NCW goals, one must make certain to differentiate 
between functional requirements and quality attributes that 
are more desired than needed.  There are a number of 
methods and metrics for the evaluation of MOE.  One of the 
more common methods is shown in Figure 1 below.   
The figure consists of five basic levels of measures.  
At the first level, the performance of each command and 
control system, combined into one infrastructure, is 
measured.  This refers to the computation power and ability 
to transmit or distribute information, that is, 
connectivity and bandwidth. This level of measurement does 
not automatically translate into increased mission 
effectiveness.  The other end of the measurement hierarchy 
is the measurement related directly to mission 
effectiveness or utility.  For combat operations, common 
measures that have been employed have included attrition 
rates, fratricide, leakage, and time to accomplish a given 
mission (Alberts et al., 1999) 
  
Figure 1: Hierarchy of Measures of Merit (From: 
Alberts, D.S., Garstka, J.J. & Stein, F.P. 1999. 
Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging 





It should be clear to the reader that Network Centric 
Warfare is by no means linear and straightforward.  Rather, 
it is cyclical and reiterative in nature.  Concentrated 
evolution and constant adjustments are required to shape 
this concept as it proceeds further into the future.  
Without superb leadership, organizational commitment, and a 
robust infrastructure, the focus of NCW could get lost in 
all the minutiae.  The military needs to constantly monitor 
NCW and its development to ensure maximum effectiveness on 

























III. THE IEEE 802.20 STANDARD 
A. OVERVIEW 
1. 802.20 Working Group 
At this juncture, it is important to note that as of 
the writing of this thesis, 802.20 is not official.  That 
is, it is not a standard approved by the IEEE, such as the 
more commonly used 802.11.  In December of 2002, the IEEE 
Standards Board approved the establishment of IEEE 802.20, 
the Mobile Broadband Wireless Access (MBWA) Working Group. 
This group’s task is to develop the specification for an 
efficient packet based air interface that is optimized for 
the transport of IP based services. The goal is to enable 
worldwide deployment of affordable, ubiquitous, always on 
and interoperable multi-vendor mobile broadband wireless 
access networks that meet the needs of business and 
residential end user markets.  They have set the following 
as their scope: 
“Specification of physical and medium access control 
layers of an air interface for interoperable mobile 
broadband wireless access systems, operating in licensed 
bands below 3.5 GHz, optimized for IP-data transport, with 
peak data rates per user in excess of 1 Mbps. It supports 
various vehicular mobility classes up to 250 Km/h in a MAN 
environment and targets spectral efficiencies, sustained 
user data rates and numbers of active users that are all 
significantly higher than achieved by existing mobile 
systems (ieee.org, 2005).” 
2. Flarion 
Flarion Technologies is one of the key members of the 
802.20 Working Group, and they have provided NPS with 
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802.20 technologies and equipment to be used in the 
Tactical Network Topology (TNT) experiments.  The TNT 
experiments will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Five.  Therefore, from this point in the thesis, it will be 




The 802.20 system is a fully IP-based, packet-switched 
wireless network. As illustrated in Figure 2, the Flarion 
system philosophy is quite simple:  
(a) Provide an efficient and secure air interface 
(radio access) to support IP-based information 
exchange,  
(b) Design the radio access to seamlessly connect 
with IP-based routers   
(c) Reduce the latency to create a TCP / IP –based 
application friendly environment.   
The system can operate in frequencies from 400 MHz to 
3.5 GHz. For trials, the wireless system operates in the 
700 MHz band. This relatively low frequency compared to 2.4 
GHz and 5.2 GHz (both ISM bands) enable the system to 
provide better RF propagation characteristics.  It supports 
various vehicular mobility classes up to 250 km/hr and 
targets spectral efficiencies, sustained user data rates 
and numbers of active users that are all significantly 




Figure 2:  802.20 System Concept (From: Michael T. 
Lander, “Flash-OFDM Technical Update,” Signals Ahead, 
Vol 2, No.3, 7 Feb 2005.) 
 
2. FLASH-OFDM 
Flarion’s technology makes use of an encoding scheme 
called FLASH-OFDM.  Like its predecessors, TDMA and CDMA, 
FLASH-OFDM is an air interface technology designed for wide 
area networks in the licensed spectrum. However, unlike its 
predecessors, the FLASH-OFDM system is pure-IP and packet-
switched, delivering broadband data and voice to a greater 
number of mobile users.  
The emerging success of the FLASH-OFDM mobile 
communications network can be attributed to its high-speed 
downlink and uplink, and low latency performance 
replicating a wired broadband experience. Based on 
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM), FLASH-
OFDM segments a wireless communications channel so that 
many users can share it. Segmenting according to frequency 
rather than time or codes (TDMA and CDMA respectively), 
FLASH-OFDM uses fast hopping across those tones to create a 
17 
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highly secure and high capacity Physical Layer (wireless 
pipe). This Physical Layer is vertically integrated with 
innovative control layers (MAC and Link Layers) to create a 
fast, reliable, and efficient process of moving data and 
voice packets wirelessly. Finally, the FLASH-OFDM Network 
Layer utilizes an all-IP and packet-switched infrastructure 
to route those packets in a cellular environment. 
3. Low Latency 
Latency is defined as the time it takes for the 
network to respond to a user command. If latency is high, 
causing noticeable delays in downloading web pages, then 
the experience feels nothing at all like broadband, no 
matter how high the data rates are. 
 In terms of latency, the Flarion packet-based 
technology has an edge over current 2.5G and 3G technology. 
In a recent trial with Nextel, the Flarion system registers 
a latency of 80 milliseconds. Contrast this to a Qualcomm 
CDMA-2000 EV-DO (“Evolution – Data Optimized”) system that 
generally registers latency of 400 milliseconds. In 
general, since the Flarion system is a packet-based system, 
it has a lower latency compared to 2, 2.5G technologies 
that are circuit-based in nature. Circuit-switched systems 
require end-to-end setup latency, which is not suitable for 
instantaneous packet traffic (Power, 2004). 
4. Quality of Service (QoS) 
QoS is defined as a collective measure of service 
delivered to the customer, and can be characterized by 
several basic performance criteria such as availability, 
uniformity, error performance, response time and 
throughput.  Flarion places its QoS feature over the air 
link, thereby supporting fast and intelligent packet 
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scheduling at the point of delivery in a way that can 
optimize IP QoS delivery for the operator and customer. 
Not only does Flarion provide QoS on the downlink, the 
network allows for a unique, non-contention based uplink 
that allots a different level of access to each packet, 
causing traffic to flow in an orderly manner. Air link QoS 
also allows for multi-tiered marketing, where users are 
classified in Platinum, Gold, Silver or Bronze designations 
to share specific resources, with more resources being 
allocated per mobile device for higher service levels 
(Flarion QoS, 2003). 
5. Wireless Security  
Wireless networks are inherently less secure than 
wired networks.  This is because in the wireless network 
data is transmitted over an open medium (air).  This 
permits eavesdropping on the communication between two 
wireless devices simply by being in the area.  Since 
wireless transmissions are, in effect, just radio waves, 
placing an RF receiver in the general area of wireless 
communications will allow a user to pick up, or ‘sniff’ 
wireless traffic in the area.  This has always, and 
probably will always, be a major concern to wireless 
network providers and operators.  
a. Layered Security (Flarion Security, 2003) 
FLASH-OFDM provides security for wireless 
traffic.  It is discussed below, differentiated by the 
different network layers. 
Air Link Layer Security 
The FLASH-OFDM link layer security deals with 
protecting the air interface between the wireless device 
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and the network access node. This is the task of the link 
layer, and it may involve authentication, encryption or 
both.   
First, the link layer protocol may specify an 
authentication protocol by which the identity of the 
communication device(s) is verified. Traditionally, the 
wireless device needs to prove its identity in order to 
obtain network access. This is referred to unilateral 
authentication, and is meant to thwart device cloning 
(theft of service). However, there has been recent interest 
in protecting the wireless device from rogue access nodes. 
Through mutual authentication, the wireless device can also 
verify that the access node through which it desires to 
communicate is indeed legitimate. 
Second, the link layer may specify an encryption 
algorithm for user data and/or signaling data. 
Traditionally, in packet-based networks such as the one 
discussed in this thesis, encryption is applied to link 
layer frames over the air link. A symmetric key (rather 
than a public/private key) algorithm is normally used, 
meaning that the same key is utilized to encrypt and 
decrypt data. In addition, the encryption algorithm should 
not be computationally burdensome to the wireless device, 
which is power and memory-limited. Encryption keys should 
always be linked to the authentication phase, as encryption 
without authentication opens the door to security attacks. 
Third, key management for the FLASH-OFDM system 
is achieved most often with the aid of a backend security 
server, which stores secret information associated with 
devices and users, and aids in the authentication task.  Of 
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the aforementioned aspects, strong authentication of the 
user device is the paramount link layer security 
requirement. It is necessary to prevent device cloning and 
to ensure proper accounting and billing. 
Network Layer Security 
End-to-end security is the only acceptable form 
of security for commercial and enterprise communications. 
Therefore, the Flarion security architecture also calls for 
security features above the link layer in order to achieve 
end-to-end security. End-to-end security consists of 
protecting the communication path between the applications 
or network stacks at the two (or more) communicating end 
nodes. For example, it is desirable to secure the 
communication between a user performing online banking and 
the network server associated with a financial institution. 
To address security concerns that affect multiple 
protocol layers and applications, an enterprise can cost-
effectively employ end-to-end security at the network 
layer. A typical example is an enterprise that provides a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) for its remote users to 
securely access its network (via a public, unsecured 
network).  Network layer security also involves three 
aspects: authentication, encryption, and key management. A 
commonly used network-layer security standard is IPSec 
(Internet Protocol Security). IPSec is applied at the IP 
layer of the TCP/IP stack, providing authentication and 
encryption of each packet, using keys negotiated between 




with protecting the network nodes from attacks within the 
wired network, such as denial of service, spoofing, and 
network intrusion. 
Application Layer Security 
An application requiring specialized/additional 
authentication or encryption support, or those that may 
need to run over networks unsecured by end-to-end means 
also employ their own end-to-end security. Several security 
mechanisms have been developed for application usage such 
as electronic mail (PGP, S/MIME), client/server (Kerberos), 
electronic transactions and Web access (SET/SSL), and 
remote login (SSH). Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) provides 
confidentiality and authentication service for electronic 
mail and file storage applications. Kerberos is a 
traditional method for authenticating users-to-servers and 
servers-to-users using a central server. Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL) uses TCP to provide reliable end-to-end service 
to other applications such as Web client/server interaction 
(e.g. HTTP).  Secure shell (SSH) is used for securing 
remote access links via IP networks. The newest version, 
SSH2, provides encryption of user names and passwords, 
authentication of users/clients and servers, and tunneling 
of applications/ports based on TCP/IP. 
b. Security Requirements and Solutions 
By virtue of being developed far after 802.11, 
802.20 has the distinct advantage of picking and choosing 
parts.  That is to say, 802.20 can incorporate those 
aspects of 802.11 that are useful and secure, and make 
extra efforts to reinforce security where 802.11 has shown 
vulnerabilities.   
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   One of 802.20’s ultimate goals is having fast 
hand-offs, so the security solutions have to maintain this 
baseline while providing a more secure connection.  802.20 
is also charged with meeting current Department of Defense 
requirements for protection of sensitive but unclassified 
information.   
The security solution chosen by the 802.20-
working group is an AES-CCM based solution.  This solution 
is the only algorithm/mode pair that the group felt 
supported all of 802.20’s pre-determined operating 
characteristics.  As the author is not in any way a 
computer security expert, this thesis will not discuss this 
solution in detail.  It will; however, try to provide an 
overview of the solution. 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a block 
cipher, and it can be used in many different modes.  A 
block cipher is a symmetric key cipher, which operates on 
fixed-length groups of bits, termed blocks, with an 
unvarying transformation. When encrypting, a block cipher 
might take a block of plaintext as input, and output a 
corresponding block of ciphertext with the same number of 
bits as the plaintext input. The exact transformation is 
controlled using a second input — the secret key. 
Decryption is similar: the decryption algorithm takes a 
block of ciphertext together with the secret key, and 
yields the original block of plaintext. 
The CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC) is one mode of 
operation for the AES block cipher.  The ‘counter’ mode 
describes an encyption method that essentially turns block 
ciphers into stream ciphers by encrypting successive values 
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of a given counter.  The counter can be any simple function 
that produces a random sequence that is designed not to 
repeat itself.  CBC-MAC stands for Cipher Block Chaining-
Message Authentication Code.  This is a message integrity 
method that encrypts each block of plaintext with the 
cipher, and then XOR’s that ciphertext with the second 
encrypted block.  That result is XOR’d with the third 
encrypted block, and so on in series (ieee.org 2005). 
When AES is used in the CCM mode of operation, 
the security of the transmissions is very formidable, which 
is one of the reasons why the 802.20-working group chose 
this particular solution.  As you can see, this creates 
more security for the wireless transmissions, while 
maintaining the mobility and speed requirements that 802.20 
is based on. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
As has been shown in this chapter, 802.20 offers a new 
alternative to the wireless networking world.  It is more 
robust, more secure, and offers a variety of other options 
simply not available anywhere else at the present time.  
Especially given the military’s unique needs and 
specifications, this Flarion 802.20 system would certainly 




IV. FAULTS OF 802.11 
A. INTRODUCTION TO 802.11 
1. Background 
The IEEE 802.11 standard is extremely popular and used 
worldwide in wireless networks.  Virtually without 
exception, whether it is a campus lab or an office building 
wireless LAN, the standard governing its performance is 
802.11.  The military uses 802.11 as well just as often as 
everyone else.  The IEEE 802.l1 standard is very 
successful. The 802.11 market share is estimated at $2.2 
billion for 2004 and $3 billion by 2007.  That means that 
by 2007, approximately 30 million units will be shipped.  
Equipment compatible with this standard operates in the ISM 
band. The ISM band is frequency ranges that do not have to 
be licensed with the FCC for use.  This means that 
operations of 802.11 networks are virtually free, unlike 
Third Generation (3G) cellular networks that cost operators 
billions of dollars just to secure the necessary bandwidth 
for 3G operations. The rapid rise of 802.11 could be 
attributed to this “free” status which results in a much 
lower cost of initial investment, roll-out costs, and 
therefore, a much more rapid rate of investment return 
(Parrish and Tovar, 2005). 
2. Versions 
802.11 standards come in 3 flavors: 802.11a, 802.11b 
and 802.11g. 802.11b provides 11 Mbps of link rate with the 
2.4 GHz frequency band, while 802.11a and g provides 54 
Mbps of link rate at 2.4 GHz and 5.2 GHz frequency bands 
respectively. With each new generation of 802.11, the link 
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rate has increased tremendously.  The next generation of 
802.11, 802.11n, is expected to reach 1 Gbps. 
3. Result 
For the military, this enormous wireless link rate and 
its relatively low cost is indeed too good to be true. 
Despite all its advantages, 802.11 standard was designed 
for ad hoc deployment, with nearly no protection from other 
wireless emitters (especially since it is in the unlicensed 
band) and no consideration for quality of service. Its main 
objective was a simple design that would result in very 
low-cost chipsets. By 2003, the cost of 802.11b chipsets 
are priced at 4 dollars and 802.11g chipsets are 9 dollars.  
With this in mind, it is expected that the market 
forces will continue to push 802.11 standards along the 
same direction.  That is, since the market is driving the 
cost lower and lower, then the vendors will make these low-
cost chips.  Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of 
quality and security.  Despite the interest of the military 
on 802.11 standards (partly because of its low cost and 
high link rate), there is very little the military could do 
to influence the design and/or the market decisions of 




The potential vulnerability of 802.11 is wireless 
security, which is of extreme importance to the military, 
for obvious reasons.  The below Figure 3 shows the flow of 
information an enemy would employ to gain control or shut 
down an 802.11 network. 
  
 
Figure 3: Electronic Warfare Overview for Military 
Systems. (From: Russell, Steven, F. 1996. “Wireless 
Channel Security Overview.” 
<http://www.public.iastate.edu/~sfr/wireless/w_tut_1.h
tml> [20 July 2005])  
 
C. POSSIBLE ATTACKS 
1. Detect and Exploit 
802.11 signals can both be disrupted and exploited. At 
the heart of this vulnerability is the fact that 802.11 is 
an open standard – its frequencies, modulation, link layer 
and media access layer formats are all known – and an enemy 
could leverage this knowledge to detect such a signal and 
proceed to leverage advanced digital signal processors and 
digital signal processing techniques to jam, locate, 
decode, spoof and position monitor the signal.  For a 





2. Smart Jamming 
It is almost ridiculously easy to interfere with an 
802.11 signal, and consequently, jam it.  For example, when 
a 802.11 compliant terminal receives an RTS (“Request to 
Send”) signal, it has to observe radio etiquette and not 
contend for the wireless channel. This is actually a clever 
feature of 802.11 to share wireless spectrum and improve 
the efficiency of channel contention (by reducing collision 
possibility and in some cases, reduce the hidden node 
problem). However, an adversary could easily exploit it by 
continuously sending out an RTS signal. This would case all 
terminals in the network to fall silent and not send any 
traffic.  And since the network is not being used for 
sending traffic, it is effectively jammed.  Since the RTS 
signal is sent in the clear and not encrypted, there is 
very little the military could do to avoid this shortfall. 
3. Denial of Service (DoS) 
Even with security features such as Wired Equivalent 
Privacy (WEP) turned on, an adversary could still spoof a 
genuine user and subvert the authentication process.  The 
adversary need not try anything fanciful in order to bring 
down the network.  All they have to do is to insert false 
routing table update messages into the network to create a 
topology oscillation that has two effects:  
a) Every packet contains a Time-to-Live (TTL) value.  
This value determines how many routers the packet is passed 
through before it is erased.  These false messages would be 
routed around the network for a long time, during which 
they could cause sufficient network congestion to 
effectively render the network inoperative.  
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b) More network routers could flood the network with 
control packets to discover and establish new routes.  This 
would have the same effect of denying service to legitimate 
users since these control packets would have priority and 
would take an extremely long time to pass through. 
 
D. SHORTFALL – CAPACITY AND COVERAGE  
1. Multipath 
Multipath propagation occurs when an RF signal takes 
different paths when propagating from a source to a 
destination node. While the signal is en route, walls, 
chairs, desks, and other items get in the way and cause the 
signal to bounce in different directions. A portion of the 
signal may go directly to the destination, and another part 
may bounce from a chair to the ceiling, and then to the 
destination. As a result, some of the signal will encounter 
delay and travel longer paths to the receiver.   
802.11 is vulnerable to multipath. This is because the 
802.11b standard is based on Direct Sequence Spread 
Spectrum (DSSS). Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing 
(OFDM) is proven to be more resistant to multipath. This is 
demonstrated amply in the Digital Video Broadcast – 
Terrestrial (DVB-T) deployment in Singapore where 5 base-
stations are used to cover a densely built-up environment 
like Singapore across an area of 50x40km. As shown in 
Figure 4 below, the receivers are installed on public buses 
that ply roads with 12-14 story buildings on both sides of 
the road. The picture quality for the streaming video is 
usually good to excellent with occasional poor or stalled 
video reception when the bus approaches a “deep fade” zone. 
  
Figure 4: DVB-T deployment for mobile reception of TV 
broadcast. (From: 2004. “Technology in Focus: Digital 
Video Broadcast - Handheld (DVB-H).” < 
http://www.ida.gov.sg/idaweb/> [20 June 2005]) 
 
 
2. Frequency Reuse 
Early 802.11 products employed static frequency 
assignments and frequency pre-planning to de-conflict the 
use of frequencies across different Access Points (AP). If 
no reuse existed, the AP’s and terminals would interfere 
with each other across AP coverage cells. The dark overlap 
regions in Figure 5 represent interference in 802.11-based 
networks from adjacent cells.   
The frequency reuse factor is a figure of merit for 
network capacity in a network with spectrum resource 
constraints. The lower the frequency reuse factor, the 
better is its ability to convert scarce frequency spectrum 
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 resource into network capacity, i.e., more subscribers, or 
higher data rate per user for same subscribers supported. 
Both early and current 802.11 products have a 
frequency reuse factor much greater than 1. 802.11a & g 
products have improved frequency reuse factors that are in 
the range of 4-6. (If the network is designed for higher / 
peak data rate performance, and operated in an indoor 
environment where the RF multipath is severe, the reuse 
factor could be as high as 16-19.) 
 
 
Figure 5: Interference across Cells(From: Kim, J. & 
Leung, K. (2002). “Frequency Assignment for Multi-Cell 
IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networks.” AT&T Research.) 
 
3. Frequency 
The 802.11 compliant products are usually operated in 
the ISM band of 2.4 and 5.2 GHz. These frequencies limit 
its ability to operate extensively in non line-of-sight 
environments, especially when diffraction of the RF signal 
due to obstructions are dominant in the degradation of the 
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RF signal, i.e., operations over a mountain, across a 
forest of tree canopy, a cluster of buildings etc. Again, 
the deployment of DVB-T in Singapore within the 600 MHz 
frequency band demonstrates the tentative advantage of 
operating in a lower frequency if better range and coverage 
is desired in an urban environment with many obstructions 
to clear, line-of-sight signal propagation.  For the 
abovementioned reasons, 802.11 technologies are far from 















V. 802.20 AND TNT 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Tactical Network Topology (TNT) experiments are 
carried out each quarter.  Experiments were conducted at 
both Ft Ord’s MOUT (Military Operations in an Urban 
Environment) facility and Camp Roberts near Paso Robles.  
In the TNT 05-02 phase, there were three separate 
experiments carried out which focused primarily in 
integrating connectivity of 802.20 into the existing 
architecture of TNT.  The full description of all three 
experiments is contained in the Appendix to this thesis.   
The purpose of this series of experiments was: 
• Operationally test 802.20 while connected to the 
Tactical Network Topology’s infrastructure 
• Demonstrate through wall capability of 802.20 
• Demonstrate non line-of-sight (NLOS) capabilities 
of 802.20 
• Demonstrate connectivity of mobile users while at 
speeds in excess of 90 mph 
 
The Cell on Light Truck (COLT) vehicle owned by 
Flarion Technologies provided network availability.  The 
vehicle is a highly mobile network provider that contains 
all the elements necessary for a wireless 802.20 network, 
including: an omni-directional antenna, base station, AAA 
server and a connection to the backhaul network. 
 
B. MOUT EXPERIMENT  
While at the MOUT, mobile-to-mobile through-wall 
communications with PDA’s was successfully demonstrated.  A 
site survey was also conducted to observe Non Line of Sight 
 (NLOS) behavior.  The experiment’s purpose was to 
demonstrate the through-wall capability of 802.20 and its 
mobility within an urban environment.  Since all the 
buildings in the MOUT are constructed out of cinder blocks, 
the test of through-wall penetration would be an appropriate 
scenario for a real-world result.   
 
 
Figure 6: The MOUT Facility at Fort Ord (From: Parrish 
& Tovar, 2005) 
 
To begin the experiment, two PDA’s were placed in the 
basements of two different buildings.  There was a bullet on 
the ground in one of the basements.  The PDA in that 
basement was to take a picture of the bullet, and send that, 
along with an audio warning, to the second PDA, which was in 
the other basement.  This experiment was completed very 
successfully, with the receiving PDA able to receive the 
warnings along with the transmitted picture of the bullet 
without any difficulty.   
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Figure 7: PDA receiving picture of bullet (From: 
Parrish & Tovar, 2005) 
 
For the next phase of the experiment, one PDA was 
placed in a sewer pipe of approximately 30 feet in length 
that connected two buildings.  The sewer pipe was 
approximately eight feet below the ground in one of the 
cinder block buildings of the MOUT.  The other PDA was 
outside of the building.  Although the connection strength 
was low between the two PDA’s it was still a successful 
test, as there was quite an impressive barrier separating 
the two devices. 
 
C. CAMP ROBERTS CAMERA EXPERIMENT 
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The second experiment was conducted at Camp Roberts.  
This experiment involved the COLT again, as well as two 
wireless cameras, one mounted on a tripod on the ground, 
and another web enabled camera attached to an aerial 
balloon at approximately 1000 feet of elevation.  The 
purpose of the experiment was to demonstrate the ability of 
the 802.20 network to capture and send these captured 
images back to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC).  The 
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measure of success in this experiment was the clarity of 
the captured images as received by the TOC.   
The camera mounted on the aerial balloon was to 
monitor a certain road, and detect any vehicular traffic on 
this road.  The balloon was approximately 4 miles from the 
TOC, where the live video feed was viewed.  The results 
were very positive.  The received video in the TOC was 
clear, and observers were able to see a moving vehicle come 
into the area and leave again.   
The camera mounted on the tripod was to get a closer 
view of any vehicles located by the balloon mounted camera.  
It had a remote control that allowed the user to pan, tilt, 
and zoom the field of view.  It was located approximately 
one mile from the base station, but was completely NLOS as 
well.  Once again, the resulting picture capture, as you 
can see below in Figure 8, was successful.  The camera was 
able to follow the vehicle as it progressed down the road, 
and observers were able to glean much more information 
about the vehicle than from the balloon-mounted camera.  
  
 
 Figure 8: Captured Image from Tripod-Mounted 
Camera (From: Parrish & Tovar, 2005) 
 
 
D. CAMP ROBERTS RUNWAY EXPERIMENT 
This experiment was also located at Camp Roberts, but 
had a different orientation.  This time, the ability of the 
network to handle high speed was tested.  The experiment 
was conducted on a runway.  There was a mobile IP camera 
located at one end of this runway, with a user and laptop 
at the opposite end.  There was another user on the network 
with a laptop and camera inside a vehicle on the runway.  
This vehicle would start at the end of the runway with the 
other user, and drive towards the IP cam at the other end 
of the runway.  At the same time, the two users would 
engage in a full duplex audio and video conversation via 
the 802.20 network.  The successfulness of this experiment 
was measured in the ability of the network to rapidly adapt 
to a high rate of speed of a user, and also in the quality 
of the video of the IP camera. 
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 Figure 9 below is a screenshot from the laptop of the 
second user, the one located at one end of the runway.  You 
can see the two videos present on the screen, as well as a 
diagnostic tool that is monitoring the transmission and 




Figure 9: Screenshot of Laptop Located at one end of 
Runway (From: Parrish & Tovar, 2005) 
 
 
From the diagnostic tool, called NetPerSec, one can 
see that the average receiving rate is 587.2 Kbps, and the 
average transmission rate is 94.1 Kbps.  Since this is 
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while maintaining two video links, one that is full duplex 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
A. OVERVIEW 
Given the ever-increasing pace of technological 
advances it becomes clear that 802.11 will no longer 
continue to offer a satisfactory level of service to 
military forces worldwide.  Especially in today’s modern 
Network-Centric military, where mission success depends 
upon wireless network connections, this thesis has shown 
that 802.20 simply offers a more viable solution that 
802.11. 
 
B. KEY COMPONENTS 
1. Security 
The wireless networking aspect that the military is 
most concerned about is wireless security.  802.11 was just 
not created with security in mind.  On the contrary, it was 
created for the purpose of sharing information between 
wireless devices; security on 802.11 came to be almost as 
an afterthought.  For military missions to be successful, a 
certain element of stealth has to be present.  If the enemy 
is able to monitor wireless communications, and even worse, 
intercept wireless communications, then mission success 
gets less and less probable.   
802.20 has the added advantage of being developed at 
the present time.  The developers are aware of the 802.11 
vulnerabilities and available exploits, so 802.20 is 
already more secure than 802.11 already, even though it is 
not actually official as of yet.  Of course, add to that 
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the additional layers of security (as discussed in this 
thesis) that are included in the 802.20 protocols, and the 
resulting level of security in 802.20 is vastly superior to 
802.11. 
Technology has allowed the military forces to act and 
respond to any given threat quickly due to faster and wider 
bandwidth for communications.  This wider connectivity 
allows the military to expand their command and control 
networks to span a much farther area of responsibility than 
for which they have previously been utilized.  While this 
enables the forces to have a drastically higher combat 
effectiveness, as shown previously in this thesis, this 
also puts a vast amount of sensitive data on these command 
and control networks.  If the networks were compromised and 
this valuable data and information were to get to the 
enemy, then mission effectiveness and the lives of the 
soldiers would be at risk.  Since 802.20 brings with it a 
much more solid and secure infrastructure than 802.11, 
security wise, it is the obvious choice. 
2. Mobility 
As previously mentioned, 802.20 incorporates high-
speed handoff into its requisites.  Flarion specifies 
speeds of up to 250 kilometers per hour.  This means that 
platforms traveling at speeds at or below this mark could 
still employ 802.20 without getting messy with the handoffs 
between cells.  This has huge advantages over 802.11, which 
does not support mobility much at all.  Ships, ground 
forces, and aircraft, all moving at relatively high speeds 
could still manage to communicate using any variety of 
methods available.  This enables these groups of platforms 
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to remain on the network, feeding information into the 
Common Operating Picture and contributing to the overall 
objective of Network Centric Warfare.  Since 802.11 does 
not support this high-speed mobility, this would be an 
enormous advantage to NCW, enabling more platforms to be 
linked together over the same network. 
This added mobility associated with 802.20 equipment 
and networks greatly adds to the war fighting capabilities 
of any given force structure.  802.20 is focused on full 
mobility as a differentiator.  In addition, 802.20 is 
designed to operate in small portions of the spectrum.  
Spectrum lower on the band is the most ideal for wide area 
and mobile networks but is largely used up, except for 
small portions.  The 802.20 standard uses those small 
pieces of spectrum lower on the band.  This use of 
frequency portions is part of what allows 802.20 to provide 
such mobility in its networks.  This added mobility is what 
will allow various military platforms to stay connected on 
the same network even at high speeds. 
3. Frequency / Through-Wall Capability 
Flarion’s 802.20 equipment operates at 700 MHz.  
802.11 technologies operate at 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz.  This 
lower frequency opens up many options in the Network 
Centric Warfare arena.  Since it operates at a lower 
frequency, it has a much better penetrating range.  Recall 
the discussion presented in the earlier section with the 
connectivity in the concrete sewer at the MOUT facility at 
Fort Ord.  The two PDA’s were still connected even with so 
much concrete and earth separating them.  This through-wall 
capability is unique to 802.20.  802.11 has limited 
 44 
through-wall capability, since it operates at a much higher 
frequency.  This higher frequency is unaffected with LOS 
transmissions where there are few barriers.  However, with 
802.20, since it operates at a much lower frequency, the 
transmissions attain the through-wall capability that can 
prove to be extremely useful in combat situations. 
Maintaining connectivity throughout a period of time is 
extremely useful, especially in combat situations, where 
instantaneous reports often mean the difference between 
life and death.  Having this connectivity would vastly 
increase the military’s range and power, as well as make it 
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SCENARIO: ON-THE-MOVE NETWORK PERFORMANCE AT MOUT FACILITY 
 
Assumption 
Future SOF and Marine Corp operations will require the 
use of an on-the-move network between multiple, dissimilar 
manned and unmanned assets to include air to provide 
situational awareness and enhanced warfighting 
capabilities.  These assets could include UAVs (micro, 
small, tactical, strategic), manned and unmanned aircraft, 
and squad personnel with advanced video/audio capabilities.  
Some assets might be permanent while others may rapidly 
join and leave the area.  Network mobility is a necessity 
driven by target mobility.  An integrated network for all 
assets and the TOC is essential for providing situational 
awareness, a common operational picture, and collaborative 
behavior.  In the near future this will also permit 
autonomous, collaborative behavior of large numbers of UAVs 
and other assets utilizing a minimum number of operating 
personnel. 
 
Basic Requirements  
• Local C3I using multiple assets with rapidly changing 
participants and network node locations 
• Network that permits control of multiple assets as 
well as rapid insertion of new assets 
• Situational awareness and common operational picture 
 
Experiment/Demonstration Technologies 
•  “On-the-move” network. 
•  Local and remote location SA from multiple assets 
 
Capabilities/Assets  
• All 802.20 tactical equipment connected to 802.20/OFDM 
network 
 





• Time and space variations of network node 
locations 





• Wireless traffic (UWB, non 802.20) 
 
Measures of Performance 
• Ability of network to rapidly adapt to number of 
nodes, location of nodes, and rate-of-change of 
location 
• Quality and effectiveness of operating team 
communications and information flow 
• Reliability and quality of asset video 
• Reliability and “usability” of SA at local TOC 
and MV 
 
Scenario 16-18 May 
To be tested is the networks ability to provide 
“through-wall” user access in an urban area utilizing the 
Military Operations in an Urban Terrain (MOUT) facility 
located at Fort Ord. 
 
Network availability will be provided by the Cell on 
Light Truck (COLT) vehicle provided by Flarion 
Technologies.  The vehicle is a highly mobile network 
provider which contains all elements necessary for a 
wireless 802.20 network to include: omni-directional 
antenna, basestation, AAA server and a connection to the 
backhaul network. 
 
Network availability and capability will then be 
tested throughout the MOUT facility beginning at the 
buildings closest to the COLT vehicle and moving outward.     
 
Network availability will be tested in a highly mobile 
environment throughout the facility.  Experimenters will 
rapidly enter and exit the MOUT buildings utilizing a 
vehicle to traverse the facility and will determine 
connectivity as a result of speed and distance from the 
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base station.  The COLT location will be pre-entered on a 
map and its logical area of coverage will be discerned 




Experimenters will establish a working 802.16 link 
into the MOUT facility, connecting to a pre-existing 
antenna on R32.  This link will require a line of sight 
shot from R32 to a ridgeline above the MOUT facility.  At 
the ridgeline, experimenters will need two AN-50s, a 
generator, one sectional antenna pointed at R32 and an omni 
antenna to connect to the MOUT facility.  Placing an Omni 
antenna at the building nearest to the 802.20 COLT vehicle 
will complete the link.  This Omni will be connected to an 
AN-50 placed inside the COLT vehicle.  Once connected, 
experimenters will ensure “plug and play” connectivity 
between 802.16 and 802.20.  From the 802.20 side of the 
network, experimenters will ping servers located at NPS and 
will utilize VOIP to communicate on the NPS infrastructure. 
 
EVENT 2 
Experimenters will utilize a Sony Pan-Tilt-Zoom camera 
located in the MOUT facility and will continue to access 
and move the camera using the 802.20 network from a mobile 
laptop.  Testing will be done throughout the facility and 
again via vehicular travel in and around the MOUT facility 
until connectivity is lost.  Network capability will be 
demonstrated by the ability to view the video stream from 




Experimenters will traverse the MOUT facility 
utilizing handheld PDA’s connected to the 802.20 network.  
They will use Microsoft Portrait to communicate with each 
other in and around the buildings.  Network capability will 
be demonstrated by the ability for the experimenters to 
communicate effectively.  Testing will specifically be done 
at two points of interest as identified by SOCOM.  The 
first location will be inside a basement and the second 
will be inside a “mock” prison cell well within a 





Experimenters will drive rapidly through the facility 
and surrounding terrain utilizing a laptop connected to the 
802.20 network.   Measures of performance will be measured 
using FMDM, Netpersec and Miperf.  Network connectivity 
will be measured in relation to distance and speed.   
 
19 MAY   THROUGH WALL PENETRATION ALONGSIDE UWB 
Through wall penetration tests will be conducted 
utilizing UWB.  Experimenters will conduct through wall 
tests of network access in conjunction with UWB tests.  
FMDM, Miperf and Netpersec will be utilized to measure 
performance and Microsoft Portrait will be utilized to 
demonstrate network capabilities.  The user’s ability to 
maintain connectivity while maneuvering in and around the 
MOUT facility will be noted.  A repeat of the above events 
may be conducted to provide necessary data.   
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SCENARIO: ON-THE-MOVE NETWORK PERFORMANCE AT CAMP ROBERTS 
 
Assumption 
Future SOF and Marine Corp operations will require the 
use of an on-the-move network between multiple, dissimilar 
manned and unmanned assets to include air to provide 
situational awareness and enhanced warfighting 
capabilities.  These assets could include UAVs (micro, 
small, tactical, strategic), manned and unmanned aircraft, 
and squad personnel with advanced video/audio capabilities.  
Some assets might be permanent while others may rapidly 
join and leave the area.  Network mobility is a necessity 
driven by target mobility.  An integrated network for all 
assets and the TOC is essential for providing situational 
awareness, a common operational picture, and collaborative 
behavior.  In the near future this will also permit 
autonomous, collaborative behavior of large numbers of UAVs 
and other assets utilizing a minimum number of operating 
personnel. 
 
Basic Requirements  
• Local C3I using multiple assets with rapidly 
changing participants and network node locations 
• Network that permits control of multiple assets 
as well as rapid insertion of new assets 





• “On-the-move” network. 
• Local and remote location SA from multiple assets 
 
Capabilities/Assets  
• All 802.20 tactical equipment connected to 802.20/OFDM 
network 





• Time and space variations of network node 
locations 




• Wireless traffic (UWB, non 802.20) 
 
Measures of Performance 
• Ability of network to rapidly adapt to number of 
nodes, location of nodes, and rate-of-change of 
location 
• Quality and effectiveness of operating team 
communications and information flow 




26  May 
To be tested is the networks “range” ability to 
provide user access in an area of varying geography and 
vegetation utilizing Camp Roberts. 
 
Network availability will be provided by the Cell on 
Light Truck (COLT) vehicle provided by Flarion 
Technologies.  The vehicle is a highly mobile network 
provider which contains all elements necessary for a 
wireless 802.20 network to include: omni-directional 
antenna, basestation, AAA server and a connection to the 
backhaul network. 
 
Network availability and capability will then be 
tested throughout Camp Roberts starting at the COLT vehicle 
and moving outward until connectivity is lost.  
 
Network availability will be tested in a highly mobile 
environment throughout the base.  Experimenters will 
rapidly enter and exit the network utilizing a vehicle to 
traverse the facility and will determine connectivity as a 
result of speed and distance from the base station.  The 
COLT location will be pre-entered on a map and its logical 




Experimenter will enter the network by placing a 
network card into his laptop and proceed to utilize Miperf 
to flood the network and receive packet throughput 
information.  Testing and recording will be done utilizing 
Flarion’s Mobile Diagnostic Monitor to record all pertinent 
information to include; SNR, throughput, GPS data, etc.  
Experimenter will then proceed around Camp Roberts via 




Experimenter will enter the network via network card 
and proceed to utilize a Sony Pan-tilt-zoom camera attached 
to the network via a Personal Access Device (PAD).  Network 
capability will be determined via the ability to receive 
quality video and audio while traversing the camp.  The 
physical limits from Event 1 will be used to determine 
vehicular path.   
 
EVENT 3 
Experimenters will traverse Camp Roberts utilizing 
handheld PDA’s connected to the 802.20 network.  They will 
use Microsoft Portrait to communicate with each other in 
and around the facility.  Network capability will be 
demonstrated by the ability of the experimenters to 
communicate effectively.  Physical limits from Event 1 will 
be used to determine experimenter’s locations.  The 
experimenters should be at the two furthest locations 
possible for transmission. 
 
EVENT 4 
Experimenters will drive rapidly through the facility 
utilizing a laptop connected to the 802.20 network.   
Measures of performance will be measured using FMDM, 
Netpersec and Miperf.  Network connectivity will be 
measured in relation to distance and speed.  Experimenters 
will simulate a rapid military movement utilizing solely 
the 802.20 network for communications.  Experimenters will 
utilize Camp Roberts airfield to make a high speed run and 
demonstrate networks ability to stream video and voice 
without any apparent degradation in quality at speeds in 
excess of 90mph (90mph is the claimed speed threshold of 
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the forthcoming 802.16e standard, 802.20 has been 
successfully tested at speeds of up to 300mph). 
 
EVENT 5 
Experimenters will demonstrate the ease of denying 
user access.  Experimenters will have three laptops 
accessing the network.  They will randomly pick one network 
card to have been compromised and will notify the COLT at 
which point network access will be denied.  All three 
laptops will be downloading information.  To be noted is 
the networks ability (time) to end the transmission. 
 
 
The above experiments will not highlight the 
capability of the technology to seamlessly handoff between 
two base stations.  Once more than one base station has 
been acquired, this can be demonstrated. 
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TNT CAMP ROBERTS FIELD DEMONSTRATION 
 
Assumption 
Special Operations Forces lack critical capabilities 
to effectively conduct network-centric operations in urban 
and near-urban environments.  Shortfalls include 
availability of shared situational awareness, high 
bandwidth and persistent communications at tactical level, 
ability to identify and track enemy personnel and 
equipment, collaborative tools and visualization to more 
effectively conduct highly coordinated combined U.S. and 
coalition activities.  Secure communications at the 
tactical level are needed. 
 
Basic Requirements 
• Maintain local C3I and global C3I for experiment 
team. 




• Web enabled cameras attached to 802.20 network. 
• Effective video transmission with reach back to 
TOC  
• Short haul wireless network: 802.20 
 
Capabilities and Network Building Blocks     
A web-enabled camera attached to the 802.20 network 
will be installed and launched via an aerial balloon.  
Connectivity will be established and maintained throughout 
demonstration to include sending suitable footage of the 
demonstration back to the TOC.  Balloon will be located at 
a distance of 4 miles from the TOC at an elevation of 
1000ft. 
 
A second web enabled pan-tilt-zoom camera will be 
mounted on a tripod and placed on a secluded road between 
COLT and the aerial balloon.  The camera will be utilized 




Flarion 700 MHz network via COLT 
 




• Distance between COLT and cameras 
• “Visibility” between COLT and cameras (LOS, OLOS, 
NLOS) 
• Distance between cameras and TOC/Command Post 





• Background wireless traffic 
 
Measures of Performance 
• 802.20/OFDM mesh networks performance 
(throughput, packet loss, latency) as function of 
distance and “visibility.” 
 
Experiments 25 May.  
0900: Re-establish connectivity to both cameras 
utilized in setup of the prior day.  Camera is to be 
connected constantly throughout the demonstration 
with picture stability and quality used as a visual 
measure of effectiveness of the experiment given the 
terrain of the area, cameras optical capabilities 
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